PNNL

Abstract

Identification and prioritization of risks to international security associated with emerging dual-use technologies presents numerous challenges. First, it demands prediction of the evolving states-of-the-art in various technological fields and, second, it requires a comprehension of the motivations and prospective selection criteria that illicit users might adopt in choosing among new technologies and their means of deployment. Nevertheless, the identification and prioritization of such threats is critical in establishing the appropriate focal points for proactive, nonproliferation policy-making. This paper addresses the question of how the threats associated with alternative means of deploying an emerging technology might be prioritized. The method revolves around systematic identification of the technological barriers to an illicit user in deploying a new technology. Evaluation of the resources necessary to overcome the barriers - such acquisition of the necessary intellectual capital and laboratory assets - then provides the basis for assessing the relative likelihoods or plausibilities of various deployment scenarios. Two optional bases are outlined for quantification of the model. One is a choice model that has found application in the analysis of consumer behavior, where the illicit user is modeled essentially as a consumer of new technology. The other employs a Dempster-Shafer framework for priority characterization. The paper describes application of the methodology to emerging life science technologies; in particular, to synthetic biology - the means of engineering biological systems. The prospect of a terrorist being able to synthesize natural pathogens or, perhaps worse still, to engineer pathogens not present in nature, creates an unprecedented threat to international security. Use of the proposed methodology to identify and prioritize threats associated with the engineering of pathogens is described.