June 1, 2000
Journal Article

The Seven (Or More) Deadly (Or Not So Deadly) Sins of Radiation Protection

Abstract

This editorial considers the errors that can occur in the routine practice of radiation protection in the workplace. This work provides a tool and an incentive for radiation protection professionals to mentally examine their radiation protection responsibilities to identify actions they may take to improve their part of the practice of radiation protection for the benefit of humankind. We introduce a rating tool that is patterned after the IAEA International Nuclear Event Scale. ?Sins? discussed include ignorance of the radiological situation, failure to integrate safety management, disabling safety interlocks, warning devices, access controls, omission of "reasonable" from the policy of "as low as reasonably achievable" (ALARA), extrapolation of risk beyond reason, using radiation exposure as an excuse for terminating an unwanted pregnancy, escalation of safety requirements beyond reason, failure to average a concentration standard, not responding to concerns (of workers, public, patients, etc.), over-training, and substitution of prescriptive procedures for judgment. Readers are encouraged to look at their radiation protection activities and judge which ones do not make sense from the viewpoint of protecting people against radiation. It is likely that readers will find more than one radiation protection activity that bears scrutiny.

Revised: July 27, 2004 | Published: June 1, 2000

Citation

Strom D.J., and P.S. Stansbury. 2000. The Seven (Or More) Deadly (Or Not So Deadly) Sins of Radiation Protection. Radiation Protection Dosimetry 90, no. 4:387-391. PNNL-SA-33819.