PNNL

Abstract

On November 13, 2003 the INMM hosted a workshop in Washington, DC entitled “The Implications of a New Era in Arms Control on Regional Nonproliferation and Nuclear Materials Management.” In this paper we summarize the workshop’s highlights and provide our analysis of the dominant themes. Ambassador Linton Brooks, Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Agency (NNSA), delivered the keynote address and focused on four points that are key to understanding the new era: • The demise of traditional East/West arms control; • The new strategic relationship between Russia and the United States; • The blurring of the distinction between nonproliferation and counter-terrorism; • The growing recognition that the nonproliferation regime is no longer adequate and needs to be strengthened. He issued a set of challenges to the workshop participants: if his premises were right, what should replace the lexicon of arms control? He described a four-part strategy for nuclear materials protection in Russia, and asked if that model should be replicated globally - potentially by leveraging the new relationship with Russia. Should it be through the IAEA, bilaterally, or some other mechanism? Asserting that the old Nonproliferation Treaty regime was inadequate, he asked what should replace it, and how do we bring it about? Three panel discussions were presented: • Implications of a New Era in US/Russia Arms Control Agreements • Implications of a New in Arms Control Upon Regional Nuclear Nonproliferation: South Asia/East Asia/Middle East • Nuclear Materials Management in a New Era of Arms Control In the first panel, Daryl Kimball, Executive Director of the Arms Control Association argued that arms control agreements provided predictability in the reduction of arms, and had been successful in advancing the methods of verification. Lucas Fischer, the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Arms Control at the US State Department acknowledged that INF and START provide a basis for verification and transparency. He defended the Treaty of Moscow, arguing that a related US-Russian joint declaration established working groups to focus on introducing transparency in offensive weapons and missile defense.