PNNL

Abstract

The management challenge facing modern non-proliferation regimes is one of long-term, multi-step technology diffusion. Because terrorist groups and other non-state sanctioned actors have demonstrated that sensitive technology can be acquired from both members and non-members of the export control regimes and then retransferred through intermediate transactions, technology diffusion in the global economy suggests that indirect and intangible technology transfer mechanisms are broadly influential in building capacity for weapons programs. This paper defines a methodology for investigating these transfer mechanisms and identifying patterns of sensitive technology trade within the context of global economic networks. Applying a network paradigm to sensitive technology transactions, statistical models of trade can infer underlying network structures that facilitate the diffusion of technology and information. This approach shows that relatively compact sets of intermediate countries can be positioned, in the sense of “economic distance”, between suppliers and recipients to efficiently transfer sensitive technologies. By identifying the sensitive information network pathways and intermediaries of concern, policy makers can better evaluate enhancements to multilateral supply regimes and promote an overarching standard of behavior beyond existing export controls that facilitates legitimate, legal trade networks while reducing the risk of sensitive technology transfer.