November 1, 2001
Conference Paper

Authentication of Radiation Measurement Systems for Non-Proliferation

Abstract

Abstract: Radiation measurement systems are central to the affirmation of compliance with a variety of agreements related to arms control and non-proliferation. Authentication is the process by which the Monitoring Party gains appropriate confidence that the information reported by a monitoring system accurately reflects the true state of the monitored item. Authentication utilizes a set of tools to provide evidence that a system performs its required and defined tasks. These tools include: functional testing using trusted unclassified calibration sources, evaluation of documentation, evaluation of software, evaluation of hardware, random selection of hardware and software, usage of tamper indicating devices, and usage of procedures. Procedures for carrying out authentication are central to the successful implementation of the complex process of authenticating systems. The procedures must allow for the varying requirements of authentication throughout the lifecycle of a system. The lifecycle of a system can be divided into the elements of design, fabrication, installation, and operations. Some procedures will be common across these lifecycle elements, while others will be unique to one aspect of the lifecycle. Radiation measurement systems are being built for use in the Russian Federation that will be the subject of US authentication activities.

Revised: December 12, 2008 | Published: November 1, 2001

Citation

Kouzes R.T., J.L. Fuller, B.D. Geelhood, R.R. Hansen, and W.K. Pitts. 2001. Authentication of Radiation Measurement Systems for Non-Proliferation. In IEEE Nuclear Science Symposium, 2, 1021-1027. Piscataway, New Jersey:I E E E. PNNL-SA-34871.