PNNL

Abstract

This paper synthesizes a unifying framework that captures a large class of transactive energy systems studied in the literature. The framework consists of four key elements: agent preferences, control decisions, information structure, and solution concept. Among them, agent preference specifies the preferred outcome by each agent and models the conflict of interest in decision making. Control decision specifies the set of decisions for each agent to maximize its payoff. Information structure describes the information available to each agent before it makes a decision. Solution concept encodes the rationality assumptions of each agent in the system. These elements are important in identifying and distinguishing different transactive energy systems. In this paper, we use them to analyze a number of important ones, including the competitive equilibrium, Stackelberg game, reverse Stackelberg game, and mechanism design. Each class of these problems is formulated as a special case of the proposed transactive energy systems. Their connections and differences are discussed. Available tools and results for each category of problems are surveyed.