PNNL

Abstract

Historically, templates have been considered for use as a treaty accountable item (TAI) authentication tool, alongside item attributes. Because of this, the use of templates has fallen by the wayside due to the perceived intrusiveness of and handling/storage of template data; especially when compared to the negotiability of unclassified attribute threshold values. However, as a chain of custody tool, templates potentially have a large and important role to play in maintaining confidence in the authenticity of the treaty accountable items as they progress through an arms control regime. In general terms, templating is the process of creating a unique, measurable, and repeatable signature which is representative of the TAI. At any point in time, the signature can be re-measured or re-inspected to verify the signature has not changed. Chain of custody is the process by which a controlled boundary is established and maintained around a TAI to both deter and detect unauthorized access to the item. Typically, this is accomplished by putting a tamper indicating device (TID) on the item or container. The TID now acts as a surrogate for the item itself, and is continually checked to ensure the unique identifier and tamper indicating mechanisms have not changed since last inspection. This in and of itself is a form of templating. A stronger template is one that utilizes a signature of the combined item and container. There are many potential signatures which may be exploited, including radiation-, electromagnetic-, and acoustic-based signatures. This paper/presentation will explore the technology and mechanisms in which templating can be applied to create a more robust chain of custody over treaty accountable items as part of a future arms control regime.