PNNL

Abstract

There are a variety of sensor systems deployed at U.S. border crossings and ports of entry that scan for illicit nuclear material. In this work, we develop a framework for comparing the performance of detection algorithms that interpret the output of these scans and determine when secondary screening is needed. We optimize each algorithm to minimize its risk, or expected loss. We measure an algorithm’s risk by considering its performance over a sample, the probability distribution of threat sources, and the consequence of detection errors. While it is common to optimize algorithms by fixing one error rate and minimizing another, our framework allows one to simultaneously consider multiple types of detection errors. Our framework is flexible and easily adapted to many different assumptions regarding the probability of a vehicle containing illicit material, and the relative consequences of a false positive and false negative errors. Our methods can therefore inform decision makers of the algorithm family and parameter values which best reduce the threat from illicit nuclear material, given their understanding of the environment at any point in time. To illustrate the applicability of our methods, in this paper, we compare the risk from two families of detection algorithms and discuss the policy implications of our results.