PNNL

Abstract

Many authoritarian regimes have taken to censoring Internet access in order to stop the spread of misinformation, to restrict citizens from discussing certain topics, to prevent mobilization, among other reasons. There are several theories about the effectiveness of censorship. Some suggest that censorship will effectively limit the flow of information, whereas others predict that a backlash will form, resulting in ultimately more discussion about the topic. In this work, we analyze the role of communities and gatekeepers during multiple Internet outages in Venezuela in January 2019. First, we measure how critical information e.g., entities and hashtags spread during outages focusing on information recurrence and burstiness within and across language and location communities. We discover that information bursts tend to cross both language and location community boundaries rather than being limited to a single community during several outages. Then, we identify users who play central roles and proposed a novel method to detect gatekeepers -- users who prevent critical information from spreading across communities during outages. We showed that bilingual and English-speaking users play more central roles compared to Spanish speaking users, however users inside and outside Venezuela have similar distribution of centrality. Finally, we measure the differences in social network structure before and after each outage event and discuss its effect on how information spreads. We find that with each outage event social connections tend to get less connected with higher mean shortest path, indicating that the effect of censorship makes it harder for information to spread.