During their December 10-11, 2013, workshop in Grenoble France, which focused on the history and future of safeguarding research reactors, the United States, France and the United Kingdom (UK) agreed to conduct a joint study exploring ways to strengthen the IAEA’s safeguards approach for declared research reactors. This decision was prompted by concerns about: 1) historical cases of non-compliance involving misuse (including the use of non-nuclear materials for production of neutron generators for weapons) and diversion that were discovered, in many cases, long after the violations took place and as part of broader pattern of undeclared activities in half a dozen countries; 2) the fact that, under the Safeguards Criteria, the IAEA inspects some reactors (e.g., those with power levels under 25 MWt) less than once per year; 3) the long-standing precedent of States using heavy water research reactors (HWRR) to produce plutonium for weapons programs; 4) the use of HEU fuel in some research reactors; and 5) various technical characteristics common to some types of research reactors that could provide an opportunity for potential proliferators to misuse the facility or divert material with low probability of detection by the IAEA. In some research reactors, for example, such characteristics include rapid on-line refueling, and a core design with room for such a large number of assemblies or targets that it is difficult to detect diversion or undeclared irradiation. In addition, infrastructure associated with research reactors, such as hot cells, where plutonium could be separated, could pose a safeguards challenge because, in some cases, they are not declared (because they are not located in the facility or because nuclear materials are not foreseen to be processed inside) and may not be accessible to inspectors in States without an Additional Protocol in force.
Revised: October 19, 2016 |
Published: September 28, 2016