PNNL

Abstract

Abstract The reduction in nuclear arms and the production facilities that supported the weapons programs have produced some unique problems for nuclear material control and accountability (MC&A). Many of these problems are not limited to the weapons complex, but have the potential to appear in many legacy facilities as they undergo dismantlement and disposal. Closing facilities find that what was previously defined as product has become a waste stream bringing regulatory, human, and technological conflict. The sometimes unique compositions of these materials produce both storage and measurement problems. The nuclear material accounting and control programs have had to become very adaptive and preemptive to ensure control and protection is maintained. This paper examines some of the challenges to Safeguards generated by deinventory, decontamination decommissioning, dismantlement, demolition, and waste site remediation from predictable sources and some from unpredictable sources. 1.0 Introduction The United States is eliminating many facilities that support the nuclear weapons program. With the changing political conditions around the world and changes in military capabilities, the decreased emphasis on nuclear weapons has eliminated the need for many of the aging facilities. Additionally, the recovery of plutonium from dismantled weapons and reuse of components has eliminated the need to produce more plutonium for the near future. Because the nuclear weapons program and commercial applications generally do not mix in the United States, the facilities in the DOE complex that no longer have a weapon mission are being deinventoried, decontaminated, decommissioned, and dismantled/demolished. The materials from these activities are then disposed of in various ways but usually in select waste burial sites. Additionally, the waste in many historical burial sites associated with the weapons complex are being recovered, repackaged if necessary, and disposed of in either geological sites or low-level waste sites. The type of waste from the decontamination and decommissioning (D&D) activities varies from uncontaminated construction materials to nuclear weapon components. This variety of forms, types, and composition of nuclear material presents many challenges to MC&A. It requires the creative application of regulations, but current regulations are adequate to ensure the security and control of the nuclear material. This paper examines some of the approaches used to meet regulatory requirements and problems that occurred during D&D. Experiences are drawn for the Hanford site and elsewhere in the DOE complex.