MEMORANDUM

Date:	**July 22, 2026**
To:	**Megan Levy, CESER**
From:	**Chelsea Sleiman, Kasey Johnston, PNNL**
Subject:	**Local Hazard Mitigation Plan (LHMP) Energy Security Preliminary Assessment (PNNL-SA-220183)**

1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Local and Tribal Hazard Mitigation Plans (HMPs) play a central role in shaping community resilience. In addition to serving as the basis for federal mitigation grant funding eligibility, they help establish a shared framework for characterizing community risks and hazards, guiding mitigation priorities, and informing local response and resilience priorities. Because they are designed to promote coordination across stakeholders, HMPs may also offer an opportunity to integrate energy considerations into broader resilience planning.

Energy systems are inherently interdependent with other community lifelines and critical services. Therefore, local and Tribal HMPs can offer insights into how communities and Tribes currently conceptualize and approach energy-related risks. Examining these plans can reveal opportunities to strengthen energy resilience and align hazard mitigation planning with energy security needs.

The purpose of this preliminary assessment of local and Tribal HMPs was to:

1) Develop an inventory of publicly available, current local and Tribal HMPs;
2) Review a sample of these plans and characterize how energy systems are incorporated into key HMP elements; and
3) Identify use cases and exemplary strategies that can inform enhanced energy security and resilience planning.

Key findings:

- Energy system impacts were most often framed as cascading consequences of other hazards, whereas standalone energy system hazard profiles were less common.
- Energy system impacts were linked to natural hazards in all of the reviewed plans, while non-natural hazards were explicitly linked to energy system impacts far less frequently.
- There is no standard approach to inclusion of energy assets in vulnerability assessments, approaches ranged from no discussion of energy assets to detailed, asset-specific analyses.
- Energy system vulnerabilities are most commonly described in vulnerability assessments as the implications of power outages for critical facilities and vulnerable populations.

- Characterization and inclusion of energy assets in critical infrastructure inventories varied widely, from no reference at all to detailed maps and descriptions of interconnections with other critical assets, in part due to differences in access to energy asset data and GIS capabilities.
- The most common energy-related mitigation action is installation of backup power at critical facilities.
- Participation by utilities and energy providers is not standard practice, and the inclusion of utilities and the public in mitigation action development was rare.
- Energy-specific data sources, state plans, and utility documents (e.g., standard operating procedures, response plans) are referenced in very few plans; however, when energy or utility specific plans are referenced in HMPs, they enhance energy system representation and GIS capabilities.
- Nature-based mitigation actions are typically described as "natural system protection" and not typically connected to energy assets.

Results suggest that while many local and Tribal HMPs recognize the importance of energy systems and their interdependencies with other critical infrastructure, the extent to which energy security is integrated into planning varies considerably across jurisdictions. Strategic approaches that serve as a preliminary framework for strengthening energy security integration into hazard mitigation planning include:

- Incorporating energy-specific hazard and vulnerability assessments
- Accounting for non-natural hazards and cascading impacts
- Aligning mitigation actions with identified energy risks
- Coordinating with state and utility planning efforts
- Engaging energy providers and power utilities throughout the planning process.

Future work should validate these findings with mitigation planning stakeholders and expand the analysis to a larger sample of plans using AI-assisted content analysis to identify regional trends and quantitative measures of energy security integration. Additional research may also examine how state plans can better support local planning, identify barriers to utility partnerships and data sharing, and evaluate the impacts of current FEMA policies and funding limitations on the incorporation of energy-related and non-natural hazards into hazard mitigation planning.

2. LOCAL AND TRIBAL HMP INVENTORY AND SAMPLE SET

PNNL began this effort by developing an inventory of publicly available and active (published between 2020 and 2025) Local and Tribal HMPs referenced in the OpenFEMA dataset titled *Hazard Mitigation Plan Status – v1*[1] in the Mitigation Planning Portal. FEMA uses this dataset to track jurisdictions participating in mitigation planning and the status of plans by jurisdiction.

PNNL used the OpenFEMA dataset to develop a local and Tribal HMP inventory with the following steps:

1) Removed duplicate entries by combining plans with the same metadata (e.g., planID, state, approval date).
2) Deployed an AI-enabled web scrape to identify plans that are publicly available online.
3) Conducted a manual quality control review to remove out-of-scope documents, such as incomplete, expired, and archived plans, as well as documents that were not HMPs, such as HMP approval documentation.
4) Indexed the resulting 618 local and Tribal HMPs into one of three plan types: multi-, single, and standard tribal jurisdictions.

PNNL then developed a representative sample from the final inventory to include in a thematic review. The selection process aimed to include plans from each FEMA region, including large metropolitan areas, natural disaster epicenters, and known energy dependent or energy producing areas states with a higher number of available plans.

The sample set used for the thematic review included 59 local and Tribal HMPs, consisting of 17 single jurisdiction plans, 33 multi-jurisdictional plans, and 9 standard Tribal plans.



Figure 1. Jurisdictions (often single counties or multiple counties together) included in review.

[1] The Hazard Mitigation Plan Statuses – v1 API Endpoint found here.

3. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

PNNL developed an analytical framework to examine how local and Tribal HMPs address energy security within key components of the hazard mitigation planning process defined by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)[2]. In addition to the mitigation planning process, PNNL also analyzed other risk-informed approaches relevant to energy systems, such as nature-based solutions (NbS), as well as energy-specific elements, including the types of energy data sources referenced in the plans.

This analytical framework was used to guide the thematic review and assess how energy security is incorporated, including:

1) Framing of energy-related hazards and energy system impacts.
2) Depth and breadth of energy system vulnerabilities explicitly described and linked to other critical systems.
3) Characterization of energy assets in critical infrastructure maps or lists.
4) Presence of planned mitigation priorities or historical mitigation actions focused on addressing energy-related risks and enhancing energy security and resilience.
5) Evidence of utility participation and public engagement during plan development.
6) Use of energy data sources, state energy or climate plans, and utility-developed plans to support analysis.
7) Inclusion of ecosystem-based mitigation actions with explicit energy system protection benefits.

PNNL applied an artificial intelligence (AI)-human workflow leveraging PNNL's internal AI Incubator platform. PNNL researchers developed code to assist with content extraction, categorization, and summarization to accelerate the thematic review, while human analysts validated findings and identified key patterns and best practice use cases. Together, the following results provide a high-level landscape view of how energy security is incorporated into local and Tribal HMPs[3].

[2] Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). (2025) Local Mitigation Planning Handbook.

[3] Results are based on a purposive sample of 59 active plans selected to span jurisdiction types and geographies. The findings describe observed patterns and examples and may not be translated to a statistical representation of all local and tribal HMPs nationally. In addition, some mitigation actions and asset details may be documented in supplementary annexes or external planning documents that were not exhaustively reviewed during this effort.

4. RESULTS

This section summarizes how local and Tribal HMPs address energy systems across seven analysis categories and provide examples found in the plans.

A. HAZARD IDENTIFICATION

Hazard Profile Framing

Across reviewed plans, energy system hazards are profiled in two distinct ways:

Hazard Profile Framing	Framing Description	Framing Example
Secondary Cascading Impacts	Energy system hazards and supply disruptions are framed as consequences of another hazard.	High winds (primary hazard) cause downed power lines and utility poles that lead to power outages (secondary hazard). (Maui Co., HI)
Primary Standalone Hazards	Energy system disruptions are identified as the main hazard with standalone profiles.	Utility failure (primary hazard), defined as any interruption or loss of electrical service caused by disruption of power transmission, can impact community lifelines. (Erie Co., NY)

Energy system hazards are most commonly framed as **secondary cascading impacts.** In fact, all reviewed plans applied this approach at least once, typically by identifying how natural hazards can lead to energy infrastructure damage and power outages at critical facilities.

Primary standalone hazard profiles for energy system impacts appeared less often. As shown in the table above, an example of this profile type was found in the Erie Co., NY.

Natural Hazards vs. Non-natural Hazards

Natural hazards were connected to energy system impacts far more often than non-natural hazards. All reviewed plans connected at least one natural hazard, most commonly high winds, storms, floods, or wildfires, to impacts to the energy system. A smaller number of plans connected non-natural hazards to energy system impacts. One example of this was found in the Waukesha Co., WI plan that described a rail transportation incident leading to fuel shortages. Other plans included acts of terrorism, either cyber or physical attacks, having secondary cascading impacts on energy assets. This type of framing was found in the King Co., WA, Kossuth Co., IA, and the City of Austin, TX plans. In other cases, non-natural hazards appeared in mitigation actions even when they were not explicitly profiled in the hazards section of the HMP. For instance, County of Kaua'i; Dallas Co., TX; and Berrien Co., MI included mitigation actions addressing security of energy systems but did not include energy system-specific hazards in hazard profiles.

Why are energy system risks more commonly connected to natural hazards?
One explanation for the limited emphasis on non-natural hazards was explicitly noted by Craftsbury, VT which stated "FEMA does not provide mitigation funds for man-made hazards."

A unique consideration was found in the San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit District HMP where an energy-specific non-natural hazard was identified as a secondary cascading impact of a natural hazard. In this plan, Public Safety Power Shutoffs (PSPS) was described as a secondary consequence to wildfires.

B. VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT

There is a wide range of detail about energy assets in HMP vulnerability assessment sections. Some plans did not discuss energy assets in their vulnerability assessments at all, while others included detailed assessments of specific energy asset vulnerabilities. This variation may reflect differences in access to critical infrastructure data, GIS capabilities, and planning priorities.

Types of vulnerabilities observed:

Vulnerability Type	Examples
Interdependencies within Energy System	• Identification of alternative mitigation strategies for natural gas utility disruption or loss to address the region's dependence on natural gas. (Ozaukee Co., WI) • International energy emergencies are described as affecting local electricity, petroleum, and natural gas supply. (Des Moines Co., IA) • "The American Society of Civil Engineers gave Michigan a D+ grade for infrastructure, and a C- grade for energy grid with weather-related power outages increasing by 55% from 2000 to 2019 due to aging infrastructure." (Barry Co., MI)
Interdependencies between Energy System and other Critical Services	• Power loss in health facilities can destroy vaccines. (Mason Co., IL) • Electrical power outages can disrupt water and wastewater treatment plant processes. (Dane Co., WI; Boulder Co., CO; City of Dallas, TX)
Energy-dependent Populations	• Medically dependent residents require access to power for medical equipment, which necessitates coordination with shelter providers for first aid support and access for people to recharge medical equipment. (King Co., WA) • Vulnerabilities among elderly populations, including heightened heating and cooling needs.

One way that plans conducted detailed assessments of energy system vulnerability was using hazard and asset mapping. Multiple plans mapped hazards such as landslides or flooding alongside energy infrastructure to draw conclusions about exposure and inform mitigation priorities.

Examples of conclusions drawn from detailed assessments of energy system vulnerabilities:

- Remove or retrofit energy assets in floodplain. (Dane Co., WI)
- Protect the generation station and power station in floodplain. (Des Moines Co., IA)
- Ensure that the solar project remains outside of the 0.2% annual chance floodplain. (Monroe Co., NY)

C. CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE INVENTORY

Energy assets were represented in critical infrastructure inventories along a spectrum from very general descriptions to highly detailed discussions. Roughly one-third of the reviewed plans did not include energy assets as critical infrastructure, while a small group of HMPs provided comprehensive, detailed inventories of energy assets. For plans with limited descriptions, some identified energy-specific data limitations and GIS capability constraints as barriers affecting the accuracy of their vulnerability assessments and the comprehensiveness of their critical infrastructure inventories (Santee Sioux Tribe NE; Chickahominy Tribe, VA; Havasupai Tribe, AZ). Other plans indicated the exclusion of detailed critical infrastructure inventories for security reasons (Orange County Water and Wastewater, CA; Ponca Tribe, NE).

Plans with comprehensive assessments often explained why they included energy system assets in their inventories. For example, the Dane Co., WI plan includes electrical transmission and distribution facilities in their asset inventories, recognizing them as critical systems highly vulnerable to local hazards based on lessons learned from past emergencies. Other plans, such as the Tallahassee-Leon Co. FL plan, noted that comprehensive inventories support recovery efforts.

Types of energy system representation in critical infrastructure inventories observed:

Type	Description	Examples
Utility-level	Energy infrastructure is acknowledged to be critical infrastructure at the provider or utility-level.	Mountrail Co., ND includes gas and electric utility providers in a “Critical, Strategic, and Key Infrastructure” section, but does not mention specific energy assets
Limited Asset	A small set of energy assets is identified, often tied to geographic or resource specific characteristics.	Mason Co., IL; Orange Co. Water and Wastewater; Clay Macon Region, NC; South Platte Tribe, NE include nuclear power plant (NPP) locations and emergency planning zones (EPZs) in critical asset lists. Barry Co., MI includes hydroelectric facilities in critical inventory section.
Comprehensive Asset-level	A wide array of energy infrastructure is systematically listed, possibly also included in maps, as part of the critical infrastructure inventory.	Tallahassee-Leon Co., FL includes a detailed energy system critical inventory list. Dane Co., WI includes maps detailing locations of electrical, gas, petroleum, sewage or stormwater, and water processing infrastructure, as well as roadways, and electrical transmission lines.

D. MITIGATION ACTIONS

The most common energy-related mitigation action is installation of backup power systems at critical facilities. Plans with more robust descriptions of energy hazards and vulnerabilities generally include more specific energy resilience mitigation actions.

Examples of mitigation actions:

- Identify alternative strategies for natural gas disruption or loss and installation of lightning-grade surge protection for critical electronic components. (Ozaukee Co., WI)

- Bring in three-phase tie line connecting areas with a history of long-term power outages. (Santee Sioux Tribe, NE)
- Install automatic transfer reclosers to improve distribution resilience. (Barry Co., MI)
- Support municipalities in creating solar ordinances to encourage responsible solar development. (Erie Co., PA)
- Update floodplain maps to protect energy critical infrastructure. (Nashville-Davidson Co., FL; Ozaukee Co., WI; Waukesha Co., WI)
- Improve and protect electrical grid capabilities to increase resiliency[4]. (City and County of San Francisco; Havasupai Tribe, AZ; Zone 7 Agency, CA)

Of note, there were mitigation action implementation challenges affecting several plans in the review. Many reviewed plans discussed the level of specificity, those responsible for implementing mitigation actions, and whether funding sources can support all mitigation priorities as impacting factors for success.

Regarding specificity, single, muti-jurisdictional, and Tribal plan developers citied information classification constraints for critical energy infrastructure information (CEII) or Protected Critical Infrastructure Information (PCII). This could mean that some plans deliberately did not include FOUO in their plans, which could remove any city-owned assets, while others purposefully left out critical infrastructure maps and lists. Without clear standardization for defining and including critical infrastructure, it is impossible to determine whether plan developers intentionally excluded energy assets or whether they were unintentionally forgotten. Some plans included references to other secure and protected documentation where this information could be found, but this was inconsistent.

Energy-specific mitigation actions assigned to outside agencies did not always have a clearly defined tracking mechanism. Some plans identified utilities or local authorities as responsible for carrying out mitigation actions. However, it was not always clear how plan developers would measure success without authority. Using vegetation management as an example, one plan stated they would “Cooperate with utility companies and residents to ensure tree-trimming around power lines and structures in order to protect new and existing buildings and infrastructure", while another plan stated the “town will conduct tree trimming. It is likely challenging to manage mitigation action completion when the plan developers do not have authority over the party responsible.

Energy-Specific Mitigation Action Implementation Challenges

- Information classification constraints for CEII and PCII.
- Unclear or undefined tracking mechanism for mitigation action completion when assigned to outside agencies.
- Funding limitations.

Broadly speaking, funding can also pose complex challenges for defining and executing mitigation actions (see Natural Hazards vs. Non-natural Hazards on federal funding considerations). Specifically on mitigation actions, a good example can be found in the Ozaukee Co., WI plan which indicated in their mitigation priorities that Fairport Electric (Fairport Municipal Commission) needed

[4] Several examples of electrical grid improvements were described in broad terms (e.g., “increase electrical grid capabilities”) and may require follow-on review of supporting documents for actionable detail.

to secure funding for undergrounding power lines. However, this action was a continued action from a previous plan update year and was defined as having "no progress" made in this active plan update.

E. COORDINATION AND PARTNERSHIPS

Examples of unsuccessful utility engagement were found in Beltrami County, MN, and Kossuth County, IA. In Beltrami County, the HMP includes an objective to work with power companies to identify vulnerable populations and assess backup power system needs. However, the current plan identified this objective as "not implemented" without providing additional details. In Kossuth County, utilities were invited to participate in plan development, but the plan noted that none participated.

In contrast, several plans documented successful utility and energy provider participation in the planning process. The HMPs for the County of Kaua‘i, HI; Maui County, HI; Tallahassee–Leon Counties, FL; and Boulder County, CO all described established partnerships that supported plan development. The County of Kaua‘i plan even assigned a utility cooperative as the lead agency for implementing energy-specific mitigation actions.

Public participation also extended beyond the standard public review process in several plans. Dallas County, TX included survey questions specifically addressing energy hazards and risks. The Concord, VT, and Southern Ute Indian Tribe, CO HMPs involved the public in developing mitigation priorities, allowing community input to directly influence the planning process.

F. ENERGY DATA SOURCES

Energy-specific data sources, state plans, and utility documents are used to improve energy system representation in HMPs and leveraged to enhance energy system representation and GIS capabilities (Waukesha Co., WI; Ozaukee Co., WI; Kossuth Co., IA; Metropolitan Nashville-Davidson Co., TN). Some HMPs also used utility-derived documents and datasets to enhance vulnerability assessments (Monroe Co., NY; Ozaukee Co., WI).

Although the use of metrics in vulnerability assessments is common practice, the use of utility-facing metrics or energy-specific metrics was not. This review identified two energy system-related metrics used to support vulnerability assessment:

1. Energy burden metrics to assess vulnerable populations. (Craftsbury, VT)
2. The Sperry-Piltz Ice Accumulation Index (SPIA) to support utility preparedness for predicted ice storms. (Sugar Hill, NH; Dane Co., WI)

G. NATURE-BASED SOLUTIONS

Nature-based solutions (NbS) were commonly described as “natural system protection” actions and not specific to energy system protections.

One plan from Tallahassee-Leon Co., FL includes an NbS that aims to sustainably manage societal challenges while providing biodiversity. This HMP includes the action to develop an Urban Forest Management Plan, emphasizing a managed canopy to make electric transmission and distribution more resilient to hurricanes.

5. CONCLUSIONS

While many of the reviewed plans acknowledge the interdependencies between energy systems and other critical services, the depth and consistency of energy-related analysis and mitigation actions is not standardized and vary widely between location and plan type. The next critical step in this research is to share our results with key stakeholders in mitigation plan development to verify accuracy and effectiveness.

In summary, strategic approaches identified in the preliminary analysis of 59 local and Tribal HMPs include:

- Develop energy-focused hazard profiles or energy system considerations in existing profiles that reflect how hazards specifically impact energy systems and infrastructure.
- Incorporate non-natural hazards (e.g., cyber, technological, supply-chain disruptions) into risk assessments to capture the full spectrum risk to energy systems.
- Include documented interdependencies between energy systems and other critical services (e.g., water, communications, transportation) to analyze cascading impacts.
- Conduct energy system-specific vulnerability assessments that evaluate exposure, sensitivity, and adaptive capacity of key energy assets and services and consider cascading impacts.
- Include energy system assets in critical inventories that are identified in vulnerability assessments as high-risk to local hazards.
- Align mitigation actions with identified energy system risks by explicitly linking strategies to specific hazards and regional energy system characteristics.
- Align with state, utility, and regional energy plans and resources to support consistency with existing operational and planning realities.
- Engage utilities and energy providers throughout the planning process to enhance vulnerability assessments, asset inventories, and mitigation action development.

Once validated, these preliminary analysis results can serve as the foundational framework for and expanded assessment in energy security integration in hazard mitigation planning. A systematic content analysis of a larger sample set could help us better understand how local and Tribal emergency management personnel document energy risks and security in their mitigation planning process. Ideally, AI tooling could be used to review and evaluate the entire PNNL inventory of publicly available plans and produce quantitative results for cross-regional comparisons.

Additional research may also investigate several cross-cutting challenges identified in this review. Some considerations for future research:

- Evaluate State HMPs to determine whether they contain energy security best practices, planning frameworks, or mitigation strategies that could be adapted or translated into guidance for LHMPs.
- Identify opportunities to improve utility partnerships across jurisdictions.
- Explore whether limitations in energy-related planning stems primarily from data availability, technological limitations, interagency relationships, or inconsistent definitions of critical infrastructure.

- Define implications of FEMA grant funding limitations for non-natural hazards, whether current policy influences the integration of energy-specific hazards into LHMPs, and what changes to guidance or funding eligibility may strengthen energy resilience planning.

6. APPENDIX A – REVIEWED PLANS

This appendix provides the 59 local and Tribal HMPs reviewed in the preliminary assessment.

Plan Name	State	Jurisdiction Type
Orange County Transportation Authority Hazard Mitigation Plan	California	Multi-Jurisdiction
Orange County Water and Wastewater Multi-Jurisdictional Hazard Mitigation Plan	California	Multi-Jurisdiction
City and County of San Francisco Hazards and Climate Resilience Plan	California	Multi-Jurisdiction
2022 – 2027 Boulder Hazard Mitigation Plan	Colorado	Multi-Jurisdiction
Tallahassee-Leon County Local Mitigation Strategy 2025 Update — Adopted	Florida	Multi-Jurisdiction
Miami-Dade County Local Mitigation Strategy	Florida	Multi-Jurisdiction
Northwest Georgia Regional Plan 2024-2028	Georgia	Multi-Jurisdiction
Mason County Multi-Jurisdictional Natural Hazards Mitigation Plan Update	Illinois	Multi-Jurisdiction
Des Moines County, Iowa Multi-Jurisdictional Pre-Disaster Mitigation Plan	Iowa	Multi-Jurisdiction
Kossuth County Hazard Mitigation Plan 2024	Iowa	Multi-Jurisdiction
2020 Lafourche Parish Multi-Jurisdictional Hazard Mitigation Plan Update	Louisiana	Multi-Jurisdiction
Hazard Mitigation Plan Barry County, Michigan	Michigan	Multi-Jurisdiction
Berrien County, MI HMP	Michigan	Multi-Jurisdiction
Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Beltrami County, Minnesota, 2020	Minnesota	Multi-Jurisdiction
Regional Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan	Missouri	Multi-Jurisdiction
North Platte NRD Multi-Jurisdictional Hazard Mitigation Plan	Nebraska	Multi-Jurisdiction
South Platte NRD Multi-Jurisdictional Hazard Mitigation Plan 2022	Nebraska	Multi-Jurisdiction
Hazard Mitigation Plan Erie County, New York	New York	Multi-Jurisdiction
Monroe County Hazard Mitigation Plan 2023Update	New York	Multi-Jurisdiction
Clay Macon Regional Hazard Mitigation Plan – 2021 Update	North Carolina	Multi-Jurisdiction
2023 Eddy & Wells Counties, N.D. Multi-Jurisdictional Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan	North Dakota	Multi-Jurisdiction

Mountrail County, North Dakota Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan	North Dakota	Multi-Jurisdiction
Umatilla County Multi-Jurisdictional Natural Hazards Mitigation Plan	Oregon	Multi-Jurisdiction
Hazard Mitigation Plan Erie County, Pennsylvania	Pennsylvania	Multi-Jurisdiction
Lehigh Valley Hazard Mitigation Plan	Pennsylvania	Multi-Jurisdiction
Bradley County Natural Hazard Mitigation Plan	Tennessee	Multi-Jurisdiction
Williamson County Hazard Mitigation Plan Update	Texas	Multi-Jurisdiction
Calhoun County Multi-Jurisdictional Hazard Mitigation Plan	Texas	Multi-Jurisdiction
Dallas County HMP	Texas	Multi-Jurisdiction
King County Regional Hazard Mitigation Plan	Washington	Multi-Jurisdiction
Dane County Natural Hazard Mitigation Plan	Wisconsin	Multi-Jurisdiction
Waukesha County All Hazards Mitigation Plan	Wisconsin	Multi-Jurisdiction
Ozaukee County Hazard Mitigation Plan Upate: 2020-2025	Wisconsin	Multi-Jurisdiction
City of Long Beach Natural Hazard Mitigation Plan	California	Single Jurisdiction
Zone 7 Water Agency Hazard Mitigation Plan	California	Single Jurisdiction
Local Hazard Mitigation Plan 2023 East Bay Municipal Utility District	California	Single Jurisdiction
Local Hazard Mitigation Plan San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit District	California	Single Jurisdiction
Hazard Mitigation Plan Update County of Maui, Hawai'i	Hawaii	Single Jurisdiction
County of Kaua'i Multi-Hazard Mitigation and Resilience Plan	Hawaii	Single Jurisdiction
City of Chelsea Hazard Mitigation Plan	Massachusetts	Single Jurisdiction
Town of Dunstable Hazard Mitigation Plan (HMP) 2024 Update and Municipal Vulnerability Preparedness (MVP) Summary of Findings Report	Massachusetts	Single Jurisdiction
Sugar Hill, NH HMP	New Hampshire	Single Jurisdiction
Stoddard Hazard Mitigation Plan Update 2025	New Hampshire	Single Jurisdiction
Metropolitan Nashville-Davidson County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan	Tennessee	Single Jurisdiction
City of Austin Hazard Mitigation Plan	Texas	Single Jurisdiction
City of Dallas Hazard Mitigation Plan	Texas	Single Jurisdiction
Craftsbury Local Hazard Mitigation Plan	Vermont	Single Jurisdiction

Jeffersonville, Vermont Hazard Mitigation Plan	Vermont	Single Jurisdiction
Town of Belvidere, Vermont Local Hazard Mitigation Plan	Vermont	Single Jurisdiction
2024 Concord, Vermont Local Hazard Mitigation Plan Update	Vermont	Single Jurisdiction
Havasupai Tribe Hazard Mitigation Plan	Arizona	Standard Tribal
Cher-Ae Heights Indian Community of the Trinidad Rancheria Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan Update	California	Standard Tribal
Southern Ute Indian Tribe Hazard Mitigation Plan 2025	Colorado	Standard Tribal
Santee Sioux Nation Tribal Hazard Mitigation Plan	Nebraska	Standard Tribal
Ponca Tribe of Nebraska Hazard Mitigation Plan	Nebraska	Standard Tribal
Pueblo of Isleta Tribal Hazard Mitigation Plan	New Mexico	Standard Tribal
Kaw Nation Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan 2022	Oklahoma	Standard Tribal
Chickahominy Indian Tribe Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan	Virginia	Standard Tribal
Oneida Nation Pre-Disaster Mitigation Plan	Wisconsin	Standard Tribal